Abstract -The deployment of police super-recognisers (SRs) with exceptional face recognition ability, has transformed the manner in which some forces manage CCTV evidence. In London, SRs make high numbers of sometimes disguised suspect identifications from CCTV. In two experiments measuring immediate and one-week memory of unfamiliar faces in disguise, SRs were more accurate and confident than controls at correctly identifying targets, and ruling out faces not seen before. Accuracy and confidence were highest when targets wore no disguise, followed by hat and plaster, sunglasses, and balaclavas respectively. Even in the balaclava condition, SRs were more accurate than chance levels. These findings add to an accumulating body of empirical evidence demonstrating that SRs possess wide-ranging enhanced face processing abilities, and their deployment should complement ever advancing computerised face recognition systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of super-recognisers (SR) who possess exceptional face recognition ability has enhanced knowledge of the wide range of ability in the population [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Interest in SRs, inhabiting the top 1-2% of this spectrum, is driven by policing and security implications. Following the 2011 London Riots, SR police identified up to a third of the 5,000 convicted rioters from CCTV. Some were heavily disguised with only the eyes visible [9] . A full time London police SR unit was later established, substantially enhancing annual suspect identification rates [4, 5, 8] . Superior face processers also work in passport offices, complementing automated face recognition systems in identifying fraudulent applications [e.g. 10] . A large body of research aims to improve face recognition algorithms and develop security systems that best interact with human operators. Parallel research on SRs is essential, as identity decisions may in future regularly be made by machine-human combinations. Understanding SR ability limits will therefore assist face recognition system developers.
Not surprisingly, disguises reduce human and computer face recognition accuracy [e.g., 11]. Other cues (build, clothing, gait) can facilitate identification, and some London rioters, known to their SR identifier, were tracked through different CCTV camera feeds, and videoed removing their disguises. Sometimes, however, SR-identified rioters never removed their disguise on camera. More recently, however, identifications made by the London SR Unit are mainly of previously unfamiliar suspects recognised and then matched across footage taken of different crimes. The aim of the current research was therefore to examine SRs' abilities to recognise disguised unfamiliar faces in this context.
Theories suggest familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed using different cognitive mechanisms [12, 13] . Familiar faces are better recognised than unfamiliar faces [14, 15] , and while familiar face recognition mainly draws on internal features (eyes, mouth), external feature extraction (face shape, hairstyle) drives unfamiliar face recognition [16] , explaining why recognition of a friend after a hairstyle change is easy, in contrast to similar changes in someone encountered less frequently. SRs however, appear to 'learn' novel faces more effectively, extrapolating facial identity across different viewpoints after brief exposures [4] . As such, disguises covering different facial features may differentially influence identification accuracy by individuals differing in face recognition ability. This has policing implications, as a belief that disguised face image identification is impossible may be made at an early investigative stage by someone with 'average ability', leading to case closure, whereas in fact identification by SRs might be possible.
To investigate this, in Experiment 1, SRs and 'averageability' controls, completed a 40-trial Disguised Face Memory Test, in which a series of single target faces in no disguise, sunglasses, hat and plaster, or balaclava, were followed by an array of 10 undisguised faces. The disguises were suggested by police as exemplars of recent cases. In Experiment 2, SRs and controls viewed a 1 min video of a target actor in one of the same disguise conditions, and at least one week later viewed a video line-up. In both experiments, in half the arrays/line-ups, the target was present (TP), half were target-absent (TA). Correct target identifications in TP trials were categorised as hits, whereas correct rejections (CRs) were correct responses that the target was absent in TA trials.
To hypothesise, SRs were predicted to outperform controls on all outcomes. Disguises, particularly the balaclava as it covered most of the face, were expected to reduce accuracy, and in Experiment 2, longer delays were predicted to additionally impact accuracy [see 17]. However, the sunglasses, and the hat and plaster only partly obscured internal, or external facial features; and therefore no specific hypotheses were made as to the relative impact of these disguises on SR and control TP or TA accuracy.
II. EXPERIMENT 1

Method
Design
A 2 (independent measures: Group: SR, control) x 4 (repeated measures: Disguise: no disguise, sunglasses, hat and plaster, balaclava) x 2 (repeated measures: target presence: target present: TP, target absent: TA) mixed design was employed. The dependent variables were TP trial hits (rates of correct target identifications), and TA trial correct rejections (CR; rates of correctly responding the target was not present).
Participants
Participants had contributed to the first author's previous unpublished research, and had volunteered for more. Those meeting SR and control criteria were invited by e-mail to take the online Qualtrics platform tests (n ~ 500). 1 Most previous SR research has employed the Cambridge Face Memory Test: Extended (CFMT+) [7] , with a minimum SR threshold of 90/102 (2 SD above the mean) (= top 2%) [e.g. 
Materials and procedure
Disguised Face Memory Test [DFMT; adapted from 12]: Before starting, participants provided consent, and were correctly informed that some faces would be in disguise, and that half the trials would be TA. Participants attempted to memorise a series of 40 single video stills of a white male target face for 8-sec in one of four disguise conditions (see Fig. 1 ). After each image, they almost immediately attempted to identify the target from an array of 10 white male undisguised faces. Participants clicked on a number associated with each face (1-10) or responded 'not present', and gave a decision confidence rating (0: guessing-100: highly confident). All images were high-quality, taken on the same day and half the arrays contained a different frontal facial photograph of the target within an array of nine foils (TP), or with the target 1 www.qualtrics.com replaced by an extra foil (TA). Each array had been constructed by selecting target-similar faces from a database of 200 trainee police officers. Disguises were added using GIMP software, 2 and each disguise was shown to each participant in Stage 1 an equal number of times: TP = 5 trials; TA = 5 trials in each disguise condition). After completing two practice trials, this test consisted of 40 trials with stimuli randomly ordered and fully counterbalanced across eight versions.
Hit rates were defined as the proportion of correct TP identifications in each disguise condition (out of 5). CR rates were the proportion of correct responses in each disguise condition in TA trials (out of 5). Mean decision confidence rates in each condition were also calculated. 
Results
A series of 2 (group: SR, control) x 4 (disguise: no disguise; sunglasses; hat and plaster; balaclava) mixed ANOVAs were conducted on each outcome (hits, CRs, confidence). Significant effects are reported only, while post-hoc comparisons were performed using the Bonferroni correction (p < .05). Where appropriate the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was applied to violations of sphericity. Occasional missing data (confidence only) were treated as such on relevant analyses only.
Accuracy 200. Post-hoc paired comparisons found that hits and CRs were highest in the no disguise condition, followed successively and significantly by the hat and plaster, sunglasses, and balaclava condition respectively (all p's < .05). Mean confidence (Fig. 2c) : A 2 (group) x 4 (disguise) x 2 (condition: TP, TA) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of group, F(1, 142) = 24.93, p < .001, 2 = .149; SR's were more confident than controls; disguise, F(2.77, 392.62) = 57.49, p < .001, 2 = .288; confidence was significantly highest in the no disguise condition, followed by the hat and plaster, sunglasses, and balaclava condition respectively (all p's < .05); and presence, F(1, 142) = 8.08, p = .005, 2 = .054; confidence was higher in TP trials.
There was a disguise x presence interaction, F(2.72, 386.73) = 12.77, p < .001, 2 = .083. In TP trials, confidence was highest in the no disguise condition and lowest in the balaclava condition (p < .001); there were no significant differences between the sunglasses, and the hat and plaster conditions (p > .2). With TA trials, confidence was highest in the no disguise condition, followed by the hat and plaster condition (p < .05); there were no significant differences between the sunglasses and the balaclava conditions (p > .05).
Experiment 1 Discussion
On all outcomes, and regardless of disguise or target presence, SRs outperformed controls and were more confident in decisions. As first phase exposure time was only 8-sec, these findings are consistent with research demonstrating that SRs are more accurate at learning and recognising novel faces, and at ruling out faces not seen before -skills that may draw on different memorial processes. Accuracy and confidence in all participants was adversely affected by disguise, with those covering the external features or the eyes impacting most (balaclava followed by sunglasses), supporting research suggesting that external features drive unfamiliar face recognition, and the eyes and internal features are more important as faces become familiarised [16] . Nevertheless, even in the hardest balaclava condition, hit rates in TP trials were well above chance levels (chance = 1/10 = 0.10) by both SRs (0.48) and controls (0.42). The implications are discussed below. However, the stimuli used in Experiment 1 had all been taken on the same day, were artificially disguised, and the delay between Stages 1 and 2 was brief. Most police investigations involve CCTV images taken at different times and recognition is normally required after longer delays. Experiment 2 addressed these issues.
III. EXPERIMENT 2 3.1 Method
Design
Participants viewed a target video in one of four disguise condition in Stage 1. At least one week later in Stage 2, they viewed a video line-up in a 2 (Group: SR, control) x 4 (Disguise: no disguise, sunglasses, hat and plaster, balaclava) x 2 (Presence: TP, TA) mixed design. The dependent variables were hits in TP conditions, and CRs in TA conditions. Confidence and delay were analysed.
Participants
Participants were invited in the same manner as Experiment 1 (n ~ 500). 
Materials Video stimuli (Stage 1):
The single target was filmed in four 10-sec colour video clips wearing no disguise, sunglasses, hat and plaster, or balaclava (see Fig. 3 ). In each clip, he faces the camera, turns right, forward, left, then faces the camera again. The video was looped so that duration of each final video was one minute. TP and TA PROMAT 3 video line-ups were created by a police officer, following legal codes of practice in England and Wales [19] . Out of a database of over 23,000, high targetsimilar foils were visually selected from a short list after entering into the system keywords matching the target's description (e.g., age, gender). Each line-up consists of nine 15-sec sequentially presented colour head-and-shoulders video clips. TP videos contained the target and eight foils; TA clips contained nine foils. Line-up members face the camera; look left, right and forward. This sequence repeats, while line-up member numbers are displayed (see [20] for a video of the procedure).
Procedure
In Stage 1, participants viewed one of the randomly assigned 1-min target videos and recorded their confidence in being likely to later recognise the suspect (0: highly unlikely-100: very likely). An e-mail invite was sent one week later for Stage 2, during which participants were warned that the suspect 'may or may not be present', and were randomly assigned to view a password protected TP or TA video line-up. They then selected a number associated with each line-up member (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) corresponding to the target identity in the line-up (or rejected the line-up), and provided confidence (0: guessing-100: absolutely certain). Hits, CRs and confidence measures were 3 Promat Envision International, Nelson, Lancashire, UK calculated in the same manner as in Experiment 1, except each participant made a single identification decision only.
Results
The mean delay between Stage 1 and 2 was 10. Accuracy: Due to low expected counts in some conditions violating statistical assumptions of a three-way loglinear analyses, it was not possible to combine group and disguise conditions into single analyses in TP and TA conditions. Therefore two separate sets of analyses were conducted to ensure sufficient statistical power.
In the first, TP and TA trials were combined, and a series of four (for each disguise condition) 2 (group) x 2 (accuracy: correct, incorrect) chi-squared tests found that SRs were more accurate than controls in the no disguise, χ 2 (1, 29) = 4.55, p = .033, ɸ = .396; hat and plaster, χ 2 (1, 26) = 8.33, p = .004, ɸ = .566; and balaclava conditions, χ
For the second analyses, the SR and control data were pooled, and a single 4 (disguise) x 2 (accuracy) chi-squared test was also significant, χ 2 (3, 134) = 11.00, p = .012, ɸ = .287. The only significant post doc test was that accuracy in the balaclava condition was lower than the other three conditions (p < .05). Confidence: A 2 (group) x 4 (disguise) x 2 (target presence) ANOVA conducted on confidence found a significant group effect, F(1, 113) = 8.75, p = .004, 2 = .072; SRs were more confident than controls. The disguise main effect was significant, F(3, 113) = 2.84, p = .041, 2 = .070; The only significant post-hoc comparison was that confidence in the no disguise condition was higher than the sunglasses condition (p < .05). The target presence main effect and all interactions were not significant (p > .15).
Delay: There was no significant correlation between delay and accuracy although the effects were in the expected negative direction, r(134) = -.14, p = .101.
Experiment 2: Discussion
As with Experiment 1 and expectations, SRs outperformed controls in three of the four disguise conditions (no disguise, hat and plaster, balaclava). The only non-significant comparison was in the sunglasses condition, mainly because the controls unexpectedly had the highest rates of accuracy in that condition. It is not clear as to the reason for this effect although, consistent with Experiment 1, accuracy in the balaclava condition was significantly worse than in the other three conditions. Nevertheless, rates of balaclava-disguised correct TP identifications from the police-prepared line-ups by SRs (0.63) were twice those of controls (0.30), which were also above chance levels despite a delay of at least one week (chance = 1/9 = 0.11).
SRs were also more confident than controls in all disguise conditions, although unexpectedly, the only significant disguise effect was that confidence was highest in the no disguise condition, and lowest in the sunglasses condition.
It is noteworthy however, that rates of correct line-up rejections in the TA no disguise and sunglasses conditions were at, or close to ceiling by both groups, and SR's CR rates were additionally at ceiling in the hat and plaster condition, suggesting a bias to (correctly) respond not present under conditions of uncertainty. However, it is important to note that the conclusions from this experiment may be limited as all participants were exposed to the same target individual in Stage 1, while taking part in only one trial. Further research is required to examine whether effects would generalise to other actors (and gender, ethnicity etc.).
IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Previous research has shown that SRs possess superior abilities at short-term unfamiliar face recognition [e.g. 1, 7] , simultaneous unfamiliar face matching [2, 8] , recognising distorted 15-year-old famous face images [4] and spotting a face in a crowd [5] . The current research was the first to demonstrate that this advantage transfers to immediate and delayed (one-week) recognition of unfamiliar disguised faces. In both experiments, using a robust threshold for SR group membership, regardless of disguise condition, SRs outperformed 'average-ability' controls, and expressed higher confidence in their decisions. Although not all effects were significant in Experiment 2, mainly due to lower statistical power, the pattern of results was similar to Experiment 1, supporting theories suggesting that disguise covering external features is most detrimental to unfamiliar face recognition regardless of face recognition ability [16] .
Identification accuracy was slightly reduced by wearing a hat and plaster (a possible tactic used to avoid detection by face recognition algorithms). However, internal features, particularly eyes, are the most important for human face familiarisation [21] and may negatively impact face learning as sunglasses covering the eyes reduced performance more. Nevertheless, the strongest reductions in identification accuracy and confidence were when targets wore balaclavas covering almost all of the face but the eyes (Figs. 1, 3) , and yet even in this condition, SRs were far more accurate than chance levels alone. After a week, SRs were twice as likely as controls to be correct in this condition.
There are implications here for computer scientists designing face recognition algorithms, or systems to assist police review of CCTV footage [e.g. 22] . Most research testing algorithms employs 'average' ability humans as controls [23] . These algorithms surpass average-ability humans with high and medium quality footage, although humans outperform the top systems with lower quality footage -which is common with much CCTV evidence. However, it is not clear whether the same conclusions would be made when comparing computer systems to SRs -even though humans will always have more limited capacity due to other factors (e.g., attentional capacity, fatigue etc.).
It should be acknowledged that there are some limitations to this research. Most suspect identifications from CCTV are made by those familiar with suspects, and images may be of lower quality than those used here. Even though SRs may be more accurate than controls at unfamiliar face recognition of heavily disguised faces, performance was not at 100%, and if giving identification evidence in court, the risks of error should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, it is very clear that the effective deployment of SRs in police forces should have a positive impact on crime detection and homeland security worldwide. It is also clear that disguise has a reduced effect on SR identification accuracy.
